Primum Non Nocere: Beneficent Deception by Simmerling, Mary et al.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 57 
Issue 2 Winter 2008: Symposium - Challenges 
to the Attorney-Client Relationship: Threats to 
Sound Advice? 
Article 3 
Primum Non Nocere: Beneficent Deception 
Mary Simmerling 
Peter Angelos 
Joel Frader 
John Franklin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Mary Simmerling, Peter Angelos, Joel Frader & John Franklin, Primum Non Nocere: Beneficent Deception , 
57 DePaul L. Rev. 243 (2008) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol57/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
PRIMUM NON NOCERE: BENEFICENT DECEPTION
Mary Simmerling, * Peter Angelos, ** Joel Frader, ***
John Franklin,**** Joe Leventhal***** & Michael Abecassis******
INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to address donor coercion, organ transplant teams
have long allowed potential donors to opt out of donation by provid-
ing blameless medical excuses, which are intended to shield donors
from external pressures, real or perceived, to donate.1 The Consensus
Statement on the Live Organ Donor suggests that this practice allows
potential donors to "decline gracefully" and "helps facilitate a funda-
mental component of informed consent, freedom of choice to be a
donor or not."' 2 Although these stated intentions form the basis for
the wide use of this practice, there may be unintended consequences
from the routine use of blameless medical excuses. 3
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AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1245, 1245-46 (1970); Jean Hamburger & Jean Crosnier, Moral and Ethical
Problems in Transplantation, in HUMAN TRANSPLANTATION 37, 40 (Felix T. Rapaport & Jean
Dausset eds., 1968); Roberta G. Simmons & Richard L. Simmons, Organ- Transplantation: A
Societal Problem, 19 Soc. PROBLEMS 36, 53 (1971); Thomas Tomlinson, The Physician's Influ-
ence on Patients' Choices, 7 THEORETICAL MED. 105, 119 (1986).
2. Authors for the Live Organ Donor Consensus Group, Consensus Statement on the Live
Organ Donor, 284 JAMA 2919, 2921 (2000) [hereinafter Consensus Statement].
3. Scott J. Cotler et al., Adult Living Donor Liver Transplantation: Perspectives from 100
Liver Transplant Surgeons, 9 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 637, 640, 643 (2003); Fellner & Marshall,
supra note 1. at 1245-46; Sander Florman & Charles M. Miller, Live Donor Liver Transplanta-
tion, 12 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 499, 502 (2006); Anthony K. House et al., Adult-to-Adult
Living Donor Liver Transplantation for Fulminant Hepatic Failure, 175 MED. J. AUSTL. 202. 204
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For instance, a blameless medical excuse may reinforce the idea
that, while donation is not a duty, there are certain circumstances
under which potential donors should be willing to accept its risks and
hardships, such as where the donor and recipient are related. Conse-
quently, offering potential living, related organ donors a blameless
medical excuse may reinforce that the only legitimate reason not to
proceed with donation is a medical contraindication and that donation
is something they should do in the absence of one. That is, the prac-
tice may reinforce the idea that unwillingness to donate is so shameful
that it cannot be openly disclosed. Another problem related to the
routine use of the blameless excuse is that it may damage doctor-pa-
tient relationships by undermining individual and public trust in what
physicians say. Nevertheless, some argue that not providing potential
donors with a blameless way not to donate unfairly puts them at risk
for negative psychological and social repercussions. 4 Some propo-
nents of this view also believe that providing a medical excuse to re-
luctant, healthy donor candidates protects their privacy. 5
Providing a medical excuse as a blameless way out of organ dona-
tion is certainly not new to transplantation. Originally intended to
reduce the pressures on potential living, related organ donors, this
practice has become a routine part of the donor evaluation and in-
formed consent process of many transplant programs in the United
States and elsewhere. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) recently suggested that trans-
plant programs must provide a "blameless explanation" for potential
donors who do not want to donate. 6 The blameless medical excuse
implicates either an anatomical or physiological anomaly that prohib-
its donation, thereby providing a medically "legitimate" reason for not
pursuing donation. In reality, the donor may be unwilling or unable
to express her reluctance to pursue donation. Under certain circum-
(2001); Chung-Mao Lo & Sheung-Tat Fan, Living Donor Liver Transplantation: Donor Selec-
tion, Evaluation, and Surgical Complications, 6 CURRENT OPINION IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTA-
TION 120, 121 (2001); Chung-Mao Lo et al., Applicability of Living Donor Liver Transplantation
to High-Urgency Patients, 67 TRANSPLANTATION 73, 74, 76 (1999): Amadeo Marcos, Right Lobe
Living Donor Liver Transplantation: A Review, 6 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 3, 7 (2000); Leslie
R. Schover et al., The Psychosocial Impact of Donating a Kidney: Long-Term Followup from a
Urology Based Center, 157 J. UROLOGY 1596, 1597, 1599 (1997): Javaad Zargooshi, Iranian Kid-
ney Donors: Motivations and Relations with Recipients, 165 J. UROLOGY 386, 388 (2001).
4. Interview with Patrice AI-Saden, RN, CCRC, Senior Clinical Research Associate, Division
of Organ Transplantation Surgery, Feinberg Sch. of Med., Northwestern Univ., in Chicago, Ill.
(2004).
5. See id.
6. JCAHO, Preparing to be a Living Organ Donor, http://www.nicelungs.com/do-
nor-brochure.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
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stances, and to satisfy the transplant center's own biases in a particular
case, the center might provide a medical excuse to a living donor
where the donor is unaware that the excuse is unsubstantiated.
Although the Consensus Statement on the Live Organ Donor con-
dones the use of an appropriate medical disclaimer, it specifically
states that transplant teams should not fabricate medical conditions
when creating excuses. 7 It is unclear where the boundary between the
two lies. Even if that boundary could be defined, it is important to
remember that the fundamental intention of the medical excuse is to
deceive through stretching or fabricating medical facts. It is also im-
portant to note that the deception will continue as long as there is a
familial or other relationship between the now "ineligible" donor and
the recipient, as well as a relationship between the recipient and the
transplant team. The "excused" donor may need to perpetuate the
fabrication in future family or social interactions, which may force her
to mythologize or embellish the deception. As Sissela Bok has ar-
gued, difficulty in maintaining a lie provides a strong prima facie rea-
son to avoid lying in the first place.8
II. EXAMPLE CASES
The transplant community has not fully considered the wider social
implications and potential harms to individuals that may be associated
with the regular use of blameless medical excuses. Routine and com-
fortable use of the medical excuse as a way to support and enhance
donor autonomy deserves further scrutiny. In order to illustrate this
conclusion and better understand some of the pressures that may af-
fect a person considering live organ donation, we present and discuss
several cases below involving medical excuses that have arisen during
recent years.9
A. Case 1-Potential Donor Refusing Medical Excuse
Not all potential living donors want to use a blameless excuse, even
when the transplant team advises them to do so. Consider the follow-
ing case, in which the transplant team offered the potential donor a
medical excuse, but the potential donor opted not to use it. A sixty-
seven-year-old man with liver cancer needed a transplant. Both of his
7. Consensus Statement, supra note 2, at 2921.
8. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (Vintage Books
1999) (1978).
9. Although these examples are based on real cases that occurred at a transplant center in the
United States, personally identifying details have been altered to protect privacy and confidenti-
ality. The name of the center is not disclosed here to further ensure this protection.
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children agreed to be evaluated for possible donation. The daughter
indicated that she took oral contraceptive pills, which would ordina-
rily require a one-month "wash-out" period before she could undergo
the donation procedure. The son's evaluation showed that he was a
good candidate medically. However, the son informed the transplant
team that he and his lover needed more time to consider the donation,
indicating that his father had never accepted his homosexuality and
had always treated his partner with disrespect. The transplant team
offered to provide the son with a medical excuse that he could give to
his family. The son refused, indicating that he wanted to tell the
truth-that he was a good candidate medically, but was choosing not
to donate. The transplant team arranged for the son to discuss this
decision with a psychiatrist to ensure that he had considered the impli-
cations of his decision. The son felt strongly that he wanted to be
forthright with his father about why he did not want to donate. Al-
though the daughter agreed to stop taking her birth control medica-
tion in order to proceed with a donation, a one-month reevaluation of
the intended recipient revealed the disease's progression, rendering
the patient unsuitable for transplantation, and he subsequently died.
This case raises a number of important issues. First, it suggests that
there are acceptable, nonmedical reasons not to donate. Specifically,
given his relationship with his father, the son did not believe that he
had a duty to donate. It was not that he was shirking his responsibil-
ity, but rather that he believed no such responsibility existed. The
transplant clinicians worried that the son's truthful disclosure of his
decision not to donate could add to family conflict at an already diffi-
cult time, and so they suggested that the son use a blameless medical
excuse rather than take responsibility for the decision not to proceed.
However, the son wanted to be truthful and tell his father that it was
his decision-rather than the medical team's-not to proceed. Thus,
he declined a blameless excuse. Rather than supporting the son's de-
cision not to lie to his family about why he was not donating, the
transplant team urged him to use an excuse and referred him for psy-
chiatric evaluation when he refused to do so. Thus, this case exempli-
fies how the use of the medical excuse may limit, rather than support,
donor autonomy. The practice of foisting unwanted lies on potential
organ donors who do not want to proceed with donation as a means of
respecting their autonomy also distorts the very principles upon which
respect for autonomy is based.
[Vol. 57:243
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B. Case 2-Potential Donor Requesting Medical Excuse
Sometimes a medical excuse may not involve a purported physical
condition. Consider the following case: a forty-eight-year-old woman
with long-standing end-stage renal disease had been on the kidney
transplant list for some time. She had encouraged her adult sons and
daughters to consider being evaluated for donation. The oldest son,
married with young children, was eventually evaluated and showed no
medical contraindications to donation., He sought consultation with
the transplant-liaison psychiatrist, because he felt tremendous coun-
tervailing pressures from his mother, who wanted him to donate, and
his wife, who did not. In the end, the potential donor decided that he
did not want to donate, but requested that the transplant team tell his
mother that they were not allowing him to proceed with the donation,
because he was the sole wage-earner of a young family.
Here, the blameless excuse moves the locus of responsibility for the
decision not to donate away from the potential donor and onto the
transplant team. While this approach may help avoid some uncom-
fortable interactions among family members, it risks impeding future
interactions between transplant team members and recipients. Other
potential donors may not come forward for evaluation if recipients
and families wrongly believe that the transplant center has a policy
that precludes all donors who have young children. Conversely, if the
mother encounters a patient who received a kidney from an adult
child in similar circumstances, her trust in the transplant team might
be seriously impaired. Perhaps most importantly, by lending its au-
thority to the son's reasons for not wanting to proceed with donation,
the transplant team reinforced the idea that the only legitimate rea-
sons not to pursue donation come from medical professionals.
C. Case 3-Potential Donor's Family Member Requesting Excuse
Consider another case that raises different issues with respect to the
medical excuse. The son of a woman in need of a liver transplant
came forward to be evaluated for donation. The potential donor's
wife did not accompany him to any of the medical evaluation visits.
The donor told the transplant team that he had the full support of his
family with regard to his decision to proceed with donation. Less than
a week before the scheduled transplant, the donor's wife called the
transplant surgeon to say that she had recently learned about her hus-
band's plans to donate from their young child. The wife was ex-
tremely upset that she had not been informed of the planned surgery.
She said that she was vehemently opposed to the donation and that, if
2008] 247
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anything happened to her husband, she would sue the surgeons and
the hospital. She stated that her husband had a history of poor judg-
ment and had lost several good work opportunities in the last year,
hurting their family's financial security. The wife said that they had
only recently restored their lives to normal and that she feared that
the donation could seriously jeopardize their progress. Despite these
objections, she refused to openly oppose the donation in front of her
husband, because he had once made it clear that he would leave her
and take their child with him if she did not support his wish to become
a donor. Thus, she asked the transplant team not to disclose her
knowledge of, or opposition to, her husband's decision to proceed
with donation.
The team members decided not to compromise the wife's request
for secrecy and did not reveal her opposition to the donation. They
concluded that it would be best to invent a medical excuse for the
transplant candidate's son. In response to the difficulties presented in
this case, the institution adopted a policy requiring the spouse of a
potential married donor to participate in the donor evaluation and
informed consent process. The transplant team's actions in this case
extend the complexity and deception involved with medical excuses:
the potential donor himself was not made aware of the excuse, and he
may have come to see himself as "damaged goods," both physically
and morally. Such an approach would seem acceptable only if one
believes that the transplant team knows better than the potential do-
nor what will be in her best interests or that pragmatic interests in
avoiding potential litigation should take precedence over honoring a
potential donor's decision to proceed with donation. The first reason
involves a blatantly paternalistic claim and ignores the patient's own
assessment of her personal best interests. The second reason may
threaten the health or life of a patient in need and poses a serious
ethical question about the goals and priorities of transplant programs.
III. DiscussioN
As noted above, "gracefully" opting out of donation by using a
blameless medical excuse has a long tradition in living, related kidney
transplantation.10 Informal discussions with clinicians at numerous
transplant centers suggest roughly wholesale adoption of the practice
so that potential donors can save face and avoid pressure or disdain
from the potential organ recipient or other family members.1 How-
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11. Cotler et al., supra note 3, at 643.
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ever, the transplant community does not appear to have fully consid-
ered the wider social implications and potential harms to individuals
that may be associated with the regular use of blameless medical ex-
cuses. This practice deserves further scrutiny.
Frequent use of the medical excuse in the context of living donor
transplantation (LDT) shares features with the then-prevalent prac-
tice of concealing a fatal diagnosis from patients in the early- to mid-
twentieth century in the United States. Physicians desired to shield
patients from the truth of a poor prognosis, believing that they were
protecting the patient's hope. 12 With various cultural and social
changes, as well as psychosocial research on the thoughts and feelings
of actual patients, it became clear by the 1960s that most Westerners
preferred to know the truth about their diagnoses. 13 Many patients
resented the medical profession's paternalistic judgments about what
was best for them, and others simply wanted to know in order to bet-
ter plan their time remaining before death.14 On both empirical and
ethical grounds, the deceptive practices proved unacceptable.
IV. ANALYSIS
While recognizing that there may be cases in which the use of a
blameless medical excuse might be necessary and appropriate-cases
in which potential donors are in fact being coerced to donate-the
transplant community should consider abandoning routine use of the
medical excuse in the context of LDT. Decisions about whether to
offer or use a medical excuse should occasion reflection on the rea-
sons that might justify lying in a given situation. Rather than seeing
the medical excuse as an essential part of the informed consent pro-
cess, the transplant community should view it as an exception to be
used only in certain circumstances. Bok suggested a process for sin-
gling out those lies that are justifiable from those that may only ap-
pear so. 15 Justifiable lies must be "publicly defensible" to "reasonable
persons.' 6 Application of this principle is useful in countering the
self-deception and bias inherent in the liar's perspective and in chal-
12. Harold A. Wilkinson, Hope, False Hope, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 63 SURGICAL NEU-
ROLOGY 84 (2005).
13. Donald Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes, 175 JAMA
1120, 1120-21 (1961); Fred Rosner, Emotional Care of the Cancer Patient: To Tell or Not to Tell,
74 N.Y. J. STATE MED. 1467, 1468 (1974); Fred Rosner, Informing the Patient About a Fatal
Disease: From Paternalism to Autonomy-The Jewish View, 22 CANCER INVESTIGATION 949,
949-51 (2004).
14. See Oken, supra note 13; Rosner, supra note 13.
15. BOK, supra note 8, at 90-106.
16. Id. at 90-93.
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lenging privately held assumptions and hasty calculations, because it
will require clear and understandable formulation of the arguments
used to defend the lie.
If this condition were applied to decisions regarding the use of a
blameless medical excuse in the LDT setting, the transplant team
might be able to identify those cases in which offering a blameless
excuse is justifiable. Although such a process would not resolve what
should be done in those cases that do not meet the condition, it might
help to identify those cases in which using a blameless medical excuse
might not be morally permissible. The authors are unaware of any
empirical evidence that currently supports the view that routine use of
medical excuses fosters the short- or long-term benefits commonly at-
tributed to the practice. Although a blameless medical excuse may
appear to expediently eliminate a potential donor from consideration,
the practice may have ramifications that are not yet well understood
and may lead to long-term psychological discomfort and disharmoni-
ous relationships for "excused" donors. Carefully facilitated early dis-
cussions with potential donors aimed at minimizing the pressures they
may face might help avoid the ethical and practical problems outlined
in this Article by avoiding altogether the need to invoke a medical
excuse in order to gracefully decline donation.
V. CONCLUSION
Although intended to protect reluctant donors from countervailing
pressures to proceed with donation, routine use of the blameless med-
ical excuse may also bring with it unintended consequences. Trans-
plant professionals who offer a medical excuse to these reluctant
donors may be inadvertently reinforcing the idea that there are cer-
tain circumstances in which potential donors should be willing to ac-
cept the risks and hardships of donation, such as where the donor and
recipient are related. Moreover, it may reinforce the ideas that the
only justifiable reason not to donate must be medical in nature and
that unwillingness to donate is too shameful to be honestly disclosed.
The medical excuse may also damage both familial and doctor-patient
relationships by undermining the trust that is so important to both.
Still, there may be occasions when its use might be justified and neces-
sary to protect potential donors who are at real risk of being coerced
or exploited and turn to the transplant community for protection.
While the transplant community deserves praise for its attempts to
provide this protection, use of the medical excuse may not be the best,
or the only, way to mitigate these harms.
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